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INTRODUCTION

This Note seeks to explain what Article V means for the methods of constitutional
change outside of the traditional Article V amendment process. Specifically, I argue
that Article V was meant to limit the federal government from usurping power
without first attaining the consent of the people. Because the Supreme Court is part
of the federal government and is often considered a counter-majoritarian institution,
the Court cannot extend the powers of the federal government through constitutional
interpretation beyond the bounds allowed in the Constitution.2 Therefore, the only
means to change the power structure of the federal government (the balance of power
between branches of government or between federal and state governments) under
the Constitution is through the Article V amendment process. 3

* J.D. Candidate 2021, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; IndianaLaw Journal
Senior Managing Editor, Volume 96. I would like to thank Professor Steve Sanders for the
conversations and invaluable feedback on this Note.
1. Alexander Bickel was the scholar who posed the question of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). Bickel posited that the Supreme Court's power of
judicial review was counter-majoritarian because it allowed appointed Justices to review
actions by the elected executive and legislative branches. Id. at 16. Since then, many scholars
have argued that Bickel's concern was incorrect because, over time, the Court generally aligns
with public opinion as the other branches appoint new Justices. Michael C. Dorf, The
MajoritarianDifficulty and Theories of ConstitutionalDecisionMaking, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 283, 284 (2010). To understand why the Court aligning with public opinion over time does
not equate to the Court effectuating the will of the people, see infra notes 77-92 and
accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Section I.B.
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On the other hand, Article V was not meant to limit the federal government's
ability to protect rights belonging to the people. 4 Although the Founders did not
foresee the Supreme Court being the institution to protect natural rights, the Founders
created a system of government that required that result.5 This argument is therefore
both originalist and structural: originalist in that the Framers had no intent to only
use the Article V method to extend rights to the people, and structural in that the
expression of general rights written in the Constitution necessarily made it the role
of the Court to protect those rights. 6
In determining how Article V should be understood regarding other methods of
constitutional change, I look to the Founding Fathers, not because the ideas of the
Founders necessarily control modern interpretations of the Constitution, but because
there is wisdom in the Founders' ideas. In most methods of constitutional
interpretation, the intentions of the Founders at least "count for something." When
designing the system of government, the Founders had a vision for what that system
should accomplish.8 By ascertaining what the Founders attempted to accomplish,
legal minds today can assess whether those goals were appropriate and whether the
Constitution was successful in accomplishing those goals. While many may disagree
with some of the Founders' ideas, those ideas are still worth consideration because
the Founders engaged in "serious deliberation," and many of their ideas have been
subsequently reaffirmed by later generations. 9

4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See infra Part II.
7. David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877,

881 (1996) ("Originalists urge that specific intentions must be taken more seriously; some
critics reject the originalist position and suggest that specific intentions should count for little
or nothing. In the meantime a practice somewhere in between-counting specific intentions
for something but not everything-seems well settled.").
8. See, e.g., Jesse M. Cross, National "Harmony": An Inter-Branch Constitutional

Principle and Its Application to Diversity Jurisdiction, 93 NEB. L. REv. 139, 143 (2014)
(discussing Founders' vision for federal power in Articles I and III of Constitution); Suzanna
Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 175, 178 (1993)

(describing Founders' vision of democracy in context of analyzing interpretation of
Constitution); Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering
OurFounding Principles,68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 507, 508-09 (1993) (discussing moral and

political vision of the Founders when forming the country).
9. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 892. Strauss uses common law traditionalism to explain
why the intent of the Founders matters. Id. at 899. Common law traditionalism refers to the
respect given to precedents under the basis that "one should be very careful about rejecting
judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in good faith, especially when
those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time." Id. at 891. Because the
Founders were making their judgments with care and deliberation and "seriously addressing
an issue," "those intentions are entitled to some respect" under common law traditionalism.
Id. at 899. Still, the text of the Constitution is entitled to more respect because "judgments not
embodied in the text are likely to be less well considered than judgments that are." Id.
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I. NARROW INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL POWER
When interpreting the powers of each of the branches of the federal government,
the Supreme Court should issue narrow interpretations and refrain from extending
federal powers beyond the four corners of the Constitution. Article V provides the
sole method for the federal government to gain more power, and that method is
exceedingly cumbersome to counter the tendencies of government to usurp power.1
Because the Court is part of the federal government," the Court cannot extend the
powers of the federal government through liberal interpretation of powers that are
not firmly seated in the words and spirit of the text. 12
The Court has a responsibility to limit the other two branches because it is best
situated to determine whether the executive and legislative branches have
impermissibly usurped power from the people. 13 The executive and legislative
branches certainly will not stop themselves from taking power. Although the people
have some control through their voting power," once they elect an official into
office, nothing stops the officials from turning away from promises made on the
campaign trail. Furthermore, although the people vote for their political
representatives, they generally do not vote for those representatives to permanently
change the allocation of power in the Constitution."
My argument is not as limiting as it may initially appear. The portions of the
Constitution providing somewhat plenary powers, such as the power of Commanderin-Chief or the Necessary and Proper Clause, 16 are valid portions of the Constitution
and provide the federal government flexibility to enact their enumerated powers. The
limited interpretation of federal powers merely encourages the Court to utilize a
stricter review than rational basis when a government action appears to go beyond
the allotment of powers described in the Constitution."
This Section will first address the words of the Founders to show that the
Constitution and Article V were designed under the assumption that the power rests
with the people and that the federal government's incentives to amass power should
be curtailed. Then, this Section will draw from other scholars to argue that Article V
was meant to be the exclusive method for the government, both state and federal, to
amend the Constitution in a manner that changes the balance of power. Finally, this
Section will explore the New Deal as an example of the Court failing to prevent the
federal government from blatantly and illegitimately usurping power from the
people.

10. See infra Section I.B.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III.
12. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.

14. See infra notes 88, 137-40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers .... "); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States....").
17. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
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A. The Founders'Concerns in Limiting FederalPower
When drafting the Constitution, the Founders were engaged in creating a truly
democratic government, a task yet to be undertaken.18 They were deeply interested
in creating checks and balances to prevent the federal government from invading the
rights of the people and infringing on the powers of the states. 19 The two important
concepts the Founders expressed in their discussions about federal powers were that
the power to govern rests with the people and that governments have a tendency to
expand their own power at the expense of the people. 20 These two concepts require
the Court to issue narrow interpretations on enumerated federal powers.
When drafting the Constitution, the Founders were creating a republican
government deriving its power directly from the people. The very nature of the new
government as a republic required that power come from the people, rather than from
God or birthright.2 1 According to James Madison, "the people are the only legitimate
fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter ... is derived." 2 2
Another Founder, James Wilson, stated that even the power held by the government
was still retained by the people. 23 The Declaration of Independence itself stated,
"Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.""
Alexander Hamilton also described the power of government as deriving from the
people.25 When critiquing the Articles of Confederation, Alexander Hamilton noted
that the Articles "never had a ratification by the PEOPLE." 2 6 One significant side
effect of not being ratified by the people was that it promulgated the contention that
state legislatures could repeal the Articles because the states enacted the Articles.2 7
This contention was one reason for basing the new constitutional government in
something "deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure,
original fountain of all legitimate authority."28

18. I say "creating" rather than "revising the Articles of Confederation" because the
Articles were not a constitution so much as a treaty among sovereign states. See Akhil Reed
Amar, The Consent ofthe Governed: ConstitutionalAmendmentOutside Article V, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 457, 465 (1994).
19. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 21-28, 42-52 and accompanying text.
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313-14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22. Id.

23. Therefore, Wilson reasoned it was the right of the people to abolish or amend the
Constitution, "of which no positive institution c[ould] ever deprive them." Amar, supra note
18, at 474. Although Wilson is not the most well-known Founder, his ideas are particularly
noteworthy because he was one of six people who signed both the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, and he played a significant role in the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia. Id.
24.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

25.
26.
27.
28.

THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In the interest of forming a government responsive to the will of the people, the
Founders developed a federalist system of dual sovereignty that provided enumerated
powers to the federal government and left the remaining powers in the states. 29 The
Founders then canonized dual sovereignty and that the power rested with the people
in the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." 30 Initially, prior to ratification of the Constitution, a major criticism
of the Constitution by Anti-Federalists was that the Constitution would consolidate
the states, leaving only one, superseding national government. 31 In these criticisms,
Anti-Federalists argued that smaller states with full power of internal regulation are
necessary to avoid tyranny because otherwise, large, extensive republic empires
"degenerate to despotism." 32 Because a national government could not appropriately
consider the interests and needs of the people in each region of a far-reaching nation,
a consolidated national government would enact oppressive legislation in an attempt
to meet the varying needs of different regions. 33 In response to Anti-Federalist
criticisms, Federalists defending the Constitution agreed with the Anti-Federalist
principals, but argued that the Constitution retained state sovereignty by limiting the
federal government to enumerated powers.3 4 The enumeration of powers necessarily
dictated that any unenumerated powers were left to the states as sovereign entities.35
The Founders emphasized that federal government invasions into the residuary
authorities of the states would amount to a usurpation of power. 36 One reason the

29.

RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 65 (1987).

30. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
31. BERGER, supra note 29, at 52.
32. James Winthrop, Agrippa IV. To the People, THE MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 1787,
reprinted in J. R. POLE, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST 77, 78 (1987)

("Large and consolidated empires may indeed dazzle the eyes of a distant spectator with their
splendour, but if examined more nearly are always found to be full of misery. The reason is
obvious. In large states the same principles of legislation will not apply to all parts.").
33. Id. ("The inhabitants of warmer climates are more dissolute in their manners, and less
industrious, than in colder countries. A degree of severity is, therefore, necessary with one
which would cramp the spirit of the other."); Melancton Smith, Speech at the New York
Ratifying Convention (June 27, 1788), in POLE, supra note 32, at 111 ("In a country, where a

portion of the people live more than twelve hundred miles from the center, I think that one
body cannot possibly legislate for the whole. . . . People will be subject to impositions, which
they cannot support, and of which their complaints can never reach the government.").
34. BERGER, supra note 29, at 52, 58-60, 64.
35. Id. at 63; THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 102 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[The federal government's] jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects,
which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate
provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other
subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity.").
In defense of the Constitution at state ratification conventions, Founders such as James Wilson
and Henry Lee maintained that the enumeration of powers in the Constitution followed the
Latin maxim "espressio unius exclusion alterius," which presumed that any powers not

explicitly stated in the Constitution were purposefully omitted. BERGER, supra note 29, at 65.
Therefore, any unenumerated powers were considered unconstitutional. Id.
36. BERGER, supra note 29, at 63.
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founding generation, including the Anti-Federalists and Federalists, advocated for
maintaining power in the states was the belief that "[l]ocal government ... would be
more responsive to and controllable by the people." 37 Therefore, the limitations on
federal power were in the interest of protecting the ability of the people to govern
themselves.
Although the Founders seemed to all agree that the power rested with the people,
how "the people" was defined had some variance. Some thought the people consisted
of a simple majority.38 Others believed that the concern of the people included not
allowing the majority to trample on the minority. 39 Additionally, the people could
include either people as individuals, political representatives of people, or both.4 For
instance, Madison expressed that the government "derives all its powers directly or
indirectlyfrom the great body of the people," and the definition of people included
the states to which they belong.4 1
The second basis for the republican structure of government established by the
Founders was to counter the tendency of governments to increase their own power.4 2
The entire system of checks and balances and federalism was developed to curb any
section of government from amassing too much power.4 3 James Madison states that
the purpose of separating the branches of government was to keep each branch "in
their proper places."4 4 Only by pitting the "ambitions" of each branch of government
against each other could the "abuses of government" be controlled.4 5 Once the people
had allotted power to the government to run the nation, the tendency of government
to take more power for itself, arising from human nature, required checks and
balances to force the government to limit itself.4 6 Similarly, the system of federalism

37. Id. at 57. This communal distrust of a national government replacing the local
governments was likely based in the colonial experience with Great Britain, which exerted an
oppressive rule from across the Atlantic Ocean. Id. at 56.
38. Amar, supra note 18, at 484. Founders providing some support for majority rule
included James Wilson, Gordon Wood, Samuel West, Elbridge Gerry, Gouverneur Morris,
Noah Webster, Archibald Maclaine, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and several
anonymous Anti-Federalist writers. Id. at 484-85. The Founders considered majority rule as a
"self-evident corollary" to popular sovereignty, id. at 484, which refers to the understanding
that the authority of the government originated directly from the people, id. at 473.
39. Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of ConstitutionalChange, 65 TENN.

L. REv. 155, 176 (1997).
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining how separation of powers in federal government prevents usurpation by federal
government); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTIONS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

37, 39 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (stating that the Constitution was meant to
limit the power of the federal government).
43. See Madison, supranote 42, at 320-22 (describing the purpose of separating branches
of government to limit each branch's power).
44. Id. at 320.
AMENDMENT

45. Id. at 322.

46. Id. at 323 ("In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted
to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a
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placed limits on the tendency to usurp power by the federal government by
enumerating specific powers to the federal government and leaving any remaining
power in the states.4 7
The purpose of creating a constitutional government was to rein in the power of
the federal government through a higher law that was written in text.4 8 According to
Stephen M. Griffin, "[c]ontrolling the power of the sovereign or the state was one of
the most important ambitions of eighteenth-century constitutionalists." 4 9 While
under the rule of Britain, the Founders experienced a domineering monarchy and
parliament that was bound by no rule of law. 50 The Founders recognized that this
unbridled power had a tendency to trample arbitrarily on the rights of individual
citizens.> To prevent the abuses of power the Founders experienced under England's
rule, they created a constitutional republic with "legal checks that would last forever
as protections against tyranny."52
Once the people had exercised their sovereign power to create a government with
limited powers as described in the Constitution, it was the role of the judiciary to
determine how those constitutional powers were defined. As explained by Alexander
Hamilton, "Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true
meaning and operation."5 3 In order to give the words of the Constitution their full
effect, the Supreme Court had to interpret the words of the Constitution and apply

division of the government into distinct and separate departments.").
47. BERGER, supra note 29, at 65. An Anti-Federalist with the pseudonym Brutus argued
that federal powers must be limited and defined because individuals in power in government
have a tendency to use that power for "private purposes, and to the injury and oppression of
those over whom they are placed." Brutus, The Essays ofBrutus: II, THE NEW YORK JOURNAL,
Nov. 1, 1787, in POLE, supra note 32, at 37, 39.
48. Griffin, supra note 42, at 39. A key attribute of constitutions, including the 1787
Constitution, was the broad, "constitutive" language that could govern a wide variety of
circumstances and policies, as opposed to "regulative" language that was similar to ordinary
legislation and "affect[ed] only a limited set of policy outcomes." Id at 40. Limiting the state
through broad language with various policy outcomes had never been done before, and it was
not certain to succeed given the difficulty of limiting the government with a fundamental law
while also necessarily applying normative judgments when interpreting broad principles. Id.

at 40-41.
49. Griffin, supra note 42, at 39.
50. See Jack P. Greene, Notes and Documents: William Knox's Explanation for the
American Revolution, 30 WM. & MARY Q. 293, 305 (Apr. 1973) (stating that the colonial

governments were initially at the complete mercy of the King, and then, upon the enactment
of the Declaratory Act of 1766, became entirely subject to the Parliament). Jack P. Greene
states that a significant cause of America's demand for independence was the failure of Britain
to provide constitutions for the colonies that would protect the rights and properties of
colonists against the power of the British government in the same manner that the British
constitution protected citizens living in the British mainland. Id at 295.
51. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the present
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States."); Griffin, supra note 42,
at 39 (The Founders "criticized the rule of King and Parliament as arbitrary.").
52.
53.

Griffin, supra note 42, at 40.
Hamilton, supra note 25, at 150.
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them to the continuing interactions among the branches of the federal government
and between the state and federal governments."
B. Article V is the Exclusive Methodfor the State and FederalGovernment to
Change the Balance of Power in the Constitution
After establishing that the Founders understood that the power remained with the
people and the government tends to usurp power, the next question is how the people
are able to legitimately amend the Constitution to give more powers to the
government. Article V of the Constitution provides an in-text process for amending
the Constitution,55 but did the Founders intend for Article V to be the exclusive
method of amending the Constitution?
Although the Framers expounded greatly on the underlying principles of forming
a government, they have fewer writings on Article V specifically. The Framers put
relatively little effort into the drafting of Article V when compared to other
conversations on the structure of government in the Constitution. 56 Thankfully, Akhil
Reed Amar has presented a convincing argument for the original intent of the
Framers when drafting Article V and how others in the founding generation would
expect Article V to function. 7 Amar draws from the writings of the Framers as well
as from the function of similar amendment provisions in state constitutions during
the late eighteenth century. 58
Amar posits that Article V is not exclusive generally, meaning that the Framers
did not intend to make Article V the only means by which to amend the Constitution;
however, Article V is exclusive to the government.59 In other words, Article V is the
only process by which the federal and state legislatures can amend the Constitution
to increase the powers given by the people or strip away the constitutional limitations
on their power.60 The supermajority structure of Article V is required for the

54. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Court in
interpreting the Constitution).

55. U.S. CONST. art. V.
56.

2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 73 (1998); Denning, supra

note 39, at 164. The greatest disagreement regarding Article V during the Convention was the
process for states to submit amendments for ratification. See Denning, supra note 39, at 16364. Madison wanted the states to submit specific proposed amendments to Congress, and then
Congress would determine the ratification process. Id. Roger Sherman worried about placing
so much control over the amendment process in Congress, so the Framers returned to the
language allowing two-thirds of the states to compel Congress to call a convention. Id. at 164.
57. Amar, supranote 18.

58. Id. at 458. States like Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania had constitutions
with provisions similar to Article V. Id. at 487. At first glance, these constitutional provisions
appeared to provide the only means to amend the constitutions, but in practice, the
fundamental principle of a government by the people meant that the people could amend or
abolish constitutional provisions through majority rule. Id. at 487-88.
59. Id. at 461.
60. Amar provides "an alternative way of understanding the implied exclusivity of Article
V: it enumerates the only mode(s) by which ordinary Government-Congress and state
legislatures-can change the Constitution, and thereby free themselves from various limits on
their power imposed by the Constitution itself." Id. at 459.

PROTE.CTIONS AGA INST TYRANNY

2020]

345

government to amend the Constitution because "[g]overnment officials often have
interests separate from their constituents, in ways that often threaten liberty." 61 This
idea is supported by the Founders' concerns about the government's tendency to
usurp power.6 2
On the other hand, Amar argues that the people retain the power to amend the
Constitution through a simple majority. 63 Many Founders, including Thomas
Jefferson, believed the people could change their government through majority
will.64 The definition of majority rule was a national majority of individuals, not the
majority of state legislatures. 65 Therefore, the right of the people to amend the
Constitution could be exercised by "simple majorities at the polls" and "popular
assemblies/conventions." 66 The Founders utilized these assumptions to legitimize the
Constitution's enactment by claiming that the Constitution was legitimate, despite
not following the amendment process in the Articles of Confederation, because the
Convention that drafted the Constitution represented the people. 67
In addition to assent by simple majority, Amar's framework requires deliberation,
meaning a considerable amount of time and discussion. 68 James Madison argued that
if the people were allowed to change the Constitution by simple majority only, then
the "passions" of the public would govern the law of the land, "[b]ut it is the reason,
alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government." 69 Therefore,
deliberation and consent of the majority is required for the people to change the
power structure of the Constitution outside of the bounds of Article V.
Sanford Levinson has expressed some agreement with Amar's proposition.70
Levinson points to the advantage, as expressed by George Mason in 1787, of
changing the Constitution in an "easy, regular and Constitutional way" rather than
risking violence in another armed revolution to change the form of government.71
George Mason also worried that the danger of leaving the power to amend only in

61. Id. at 504.
62. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
63. Amar, supra note 18, at 461.

64. Id. at 482-84.
65. Id. at 506. Alexander Hamilton wrote that the majority should rule in a republican
government, but the majority should not be defined as majority of states because of the
potential for a "majority of States [to be] a small minority of the people." Hamilton, supra note
25, at 146. Hamilton believed that the people in the larger states would never acquiesce to this
imbalance of power, which would allow a minority to rule over the majority, preventing the
government from engaging in necessary actions with any efficiency. Id. at 146, 148.
66. Amar, supra note 18, at 464.
67. Alexander Hamilton claimed that the Constitution was more legitimate than the
Articles of Confederation because the Constitution was approved by the people as a whole
while the Articles were approved only by state legislatures. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 152.
68.

Amar, supra note 18, at 502.

69. Madison, supra note 21, at 317.
70.

Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST.

COMMENT. 107, 114 (1996) (agreeing with Amar that Article V is a protection of the people
against cormpt "political agents" rather than being a barrier to changing the "political status
quo," but disagreeing with Amar's proposal for popular referendums to change the
Constitution).

71. Id. at 112.
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the hands of Congress-or in the hands of Congress and the states under Article Vwas that "no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people,
if the Government should become oppressive.
A method for amending the
Constitution outside of the Article V procedures is therefore required to allow the
people to put forth constitutional amendments that meet the needs of the people and
provide a check on the government. 73
Under Amar's framework, with some support by Levinson, a system of
referendums, such as in California, that only require a simple majority to amend the
Constitution would be a legitimate means of amending the Constitution outside of
the Article V process.7 4 A modern system of amending the Constitution through the
people would require several years of referendums rather than a single vote to meet
Amar's requirement for deliberation. 75 The other option would be for the people to
first elect representatives to deliberate in a convention, similar to the Convention that
drafted the Constitution, and then submit any proposed amendments to a vote in the
state s.7 6
Popular constitutionalism, proffered by Larry Kramer, seems to follow Amar's
framework and presents a legitimate alternative method of constitutional change by
asserting that the final decision on constitutional meaning belongs to the people. 7
Popular constitutionalism maintains that the Founders did not intend for the judiciary
to have the final say on the meaning of the Constitution.78 Therefore, change to the
Constitution through constitutional interpretation legitimately occurs through the
people, not the courts. 79 Under popular constitutionalism, the people should
determine the final meaning of the Constitution through protests, petitions, and
referendums. 80 Because the current political discourse supports judicial supremacy
on constitutional meaning, 81 the legitimate methods of constitutional change

72. Id. at 113.

73. See id. at 113-14 ("[T]o limit constitutional amendment only to what gains the assent
of those already ensconced within governmental institutions is, almost by definition, to lessen
the possibility that the occupants of political office will be amenable to proposals that would
significantly affect their interests.").
74. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8-10; see also Amar, supra note 18, at 464; Levinson, supra
note 70, at 114.
75. See Amar, supra note 18, at 502.

76. See id. at 464 (stating that people could exercise right to amend Constitution through
popular conventions). A vote in the states is required to preserve state sovereignty. The states
were individually sovereign from the moment of independence from Great Britain, and
therefore each state must consent to be governed by a national government. See Berger, supra
note 29, at 22; Amar, supra note 18, at 487 n.112.
77.

LARRY

D.

KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND

JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004).

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181 (1999)
("And the Constitution belongs to us collectively, as we act together in political dialogue with
each other- whether we act in the streets, in the voting booths, or in legislatures as
representatives of others.").
81. KRAMER, supra note 77, at 228.
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proposed by Kramer and Amar are not utilized today, leaving the question of whether
there is a legitimate means of amending the Constitution currently in practice.
Some scholars have argued that the dialogic model is a system of legitimate
constitutional change currently occurring in the court systems. 82 The dialogic model
attempts to legitimize the living constitutionalism method of interpretation by
presenting evolving Court interpretations of the Constitution as part of a dialogue
with the people. 83 In living constitutionalism, the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution changes as history progresses and circumstances evolve beyond what
the Founders considered, which in turn alters the meaning of the Constitution.84 In
the dialogic model, as the people argue about what the Constitution means, the Court
adjusts its interpretation of the Constitution in a conversation with the people. 85
Therefore, as the Court changes the Constitution through interpretive methods, the
change is legitimized as reflecting the will of the people.
Bruce Ackerman proposes another model of legitimate extraconstitutional change
that also has modern examples. 86 Ackerman focuses on the Reconstruction and the
New Deal but proposes that this method of constitutional change is still in use
today. 8 7 Under Ackerman's model, constitutional change outside of Article V is
legitimate when the President receives a mandate from the people through a landslide
election and appoints Justices who align with that President's goals. 88 Then the
legitimate change occurs through these Justices issuing decisions that align with the
President's mandate from the people. 89
Although the dialogic model and Ackerman's model have attempted to create
frameworks for legitimately amending or changing the Constitution by the people
outside of the strict Article V process and without a direct appeal from the people,
these frameworks overreach when they change the powers granted under the
Constitution.90 The people must be able to directly assent to power being taken by
the federal government, whether that power is taken from one branch to another,
from states, or from the people directly. This higher threshold is required because of

82. See Steve Sanders, Dignity and Social Meaning: Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence
as ConstitutionalDialogue, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069, 2074 (2019) (describing the general

scholarship on the dialogic model of constitutional interpretation).
83.

See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 679-80

(1993) (arguing that the dialogic process prevents the judiciary from excessively deviating
from popular will).
84. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual
Structure of the GreatDebate, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. 1243, 1259 (2019).

85. Friedman, supra note 83, at 657.
86.

ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 27.

87. Id.
88. See id. at 26-27.
89. See id. at 26.
90. Other scholars have also attempted to create frameworks for legitimate constitutional
change beyond the Article V process and without direct appeals to the people as described in
Amar's model. See Denning, supra note 39, at 180-209 (criticizing theories of constitutional
amendment outside of Article V process by Sanford Levinson, Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Reed
Amar, and Daniel Lazare, and proposing theory of legitimate constitutional change outside of
Article V process proffered by himself, Sanford Levinson, Stephen Griffin, and Frederick
Schauer).
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the incentives and dangers of the federal government to usurp power when given the
opportunity. 91 Both the dialogic and Ackerman's models depend on the assumption
that the people can make their will known to Supreme Court Justices, whether
through dialogue or through voting for a President. 92 However, people have not voted
directly for the Justices, nor have they voted to change their Constitution through the
interpretative methods used by Justices. Because of the lack of direct connection
between Justices and the people, Justices cannot legitimately enact the will of the
people.
There is also support that Article V was meant to be the exclusive method of
constitutional amendment. Mark Tushnet argues that a constitution requires "some
degree of institutional stability ... which suggests that it should not be too easy to
amend all of a constitution's provisions, or perhaps any of its basic institutional
prescriptions." 9 3 James Madison, who disagreed that majority rule should amend the
Constitution, believed that continuously appealing to the people to amend the
Constitution would prevent the Constitution from obtaining a necessary degree of
stability, and the people would lose faith in the Constitution's ability to handle
American governance. 94 By relying only on the cumbersome Article V process to
make amendments, Article V's exclusivity promotes stability in the constitutional
government. 95
Another concern is the interest of minorities. According to Brannon Denning,
"[b]ecause one aim of the Constitution was protection of minority interests from the
whims of temporary majorities, simple majoritarian change of the fundamental law
seemed insufficient to insure the legitimacy of such change." 96 Instead, there must
be a consensus among the people to amend the Constitution legitimately. 97 Alexander
Bickel defines "consensus" as the "general assent" of the people over time and in the
"foreseeable future."98 At the bare minimum, consensus is met in the
supermajoritarian requirements of Article V amendments. Although only a small
minority can prevent an amendment to the Constitution under Article V, 99 perhaps
that is the entire point.

91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
Mark Tushnet, The Whole Thing, 12 CONST. CoMM. 223, 225 (1995).
Madison, supra note 21, at 314; Denning, supra note 39, at 170. During the

deliberations in the Convention on Article V, Madison was also concerned with the potential
unwieldy nature of conventions proposing amendments and the possibility for states to "pick
apart" the Constitution. Denning, supra note 39, at 164.

95. See US. CONST. art. V.
96.

Denning, supra note 39, at 176 (footnote omitted).

97. Id.
98. Bickel defines consensus in his defense that the Court can legitimately change the
meaning of the Constitution through interpretation. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 239. While Bickel
argues that the Court can ascertain a consensus by the people, id, it is unlikely the Court can
do so with any accuracy absent some type of poll or direct vote.
99. Because of the supermajority requirements under Article V, even after 2/3 of both
houses of Congress have approved an amendment for ratification, it only takes 1/4 of the states
no matter how small the population of that state to prevent ratification of an amendment. U.S.
CONST. art. V.
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Whether under Amar's framework or whether under the assumption that Article
V is exclusive, the Court has an obligation to interpret the powers of the government
narrowly, limiting those powers to the ones described in the Constitution.0 0 That the
Constitution places limitations on the legislative and executive branches requires a
court to interpret the Constitution to enforce those limitations." 1 Certainly, the other
branches would not voluntarily limit themselves by following an honest and unbiased
interpretation of the Constitution. 10 2 Because of life terms and the appointment
process,10 3 the Court has a degree of separation from the political sphere that makes
it the only branch with any chance of escaping bias.
Thomas Jefferson encouraged a narrow interpretation based on the premise that
the power of the government should not exceed that which was given by the people:
I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, when it is
found necessary, than to assume by a construction which would make
our powers boundless. . . . I confess, then, I think it important, in the
present case, to set an example against broad construction by appealing
for new power to the people.1 4
Because the Court does not represent the people, majority or otherwise, the Court
cannot grant greater powers to the federal government from the states or to other
branches of government beyond what is inherent in the Constitution. 15 Necessarily,
the work of interpretation will change the meaning of the Constitution somewhat
through normative judgments when applying the broad principles in the
Constitution. 106 Still, the Court must avoid granting more power than is implicit in
the Constitution and correct itself when it grants too much power in its interpretative

role.

100. According to Alexander Hamilton and Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court's power
of judicial review holds the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution above the will
of the people as expressed in the legislature. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16; see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
101. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."); BERGER, supra note 29, at 66 (noting that
Chief Justice Marshall stated that judges had to declare void laws beyond the limits of the
enumerated powers).
102. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178 ("It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow
limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed as pleasure.").
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, § 1.
104. Griffin, supra note 42, at 42 n.22. Jefferson made this statement in the context of
whether he, as the President, had the power to make the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 without
seeking an amendment. Id. at 42. Although Jefferson ultimately did not pursue an amendment
to make the purchase, his argument in favor of the government making appeals to the people
before expanding constitutional powers still remains. Id. at 42 n.22.
105. Because the people have consented to be governed by the Constitution but have not
consented to constitutional change through judicial interpretation, judicial revision of the
balance of power inherent in federalism subverts the consent of the people to be governed by
the principles of the Constitution. BERGER, supra note 29, at 11-12.
106. Griffin, supra note 42, at 41.
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C. New Deal: ConstitutionalInterpretationGone Wrong
The next question is when does judicial interpretation exceed the narrow
interpretation of enumerated powers. There is no neat formula, so I will instead
expound on an example of when judicial interpretation has exceeded its bounds and
granted too much power to the federal government. This example arises out of the
New Deal era. Specifically, I will be focusing on the Supreme Court's changed
interpretation of the Commerce Clause that resulted in many decades of complete
deference to congressional power. 107 This interpretation effectively took the power
away from the people without their direct assent and gave it to Congress, and the
people have never been able to take it back. 108
The New Deal era, the period when Franklin Roosevelt was president (19331945), experienced significant and lasting changes in the structure of government. 109
Some of these changes, which occurred in the years before Roosevelt took office,
were through Article V amendments-namely, the Sixteenth (income tax) and
Seventeenth (direct election of senators) Amendments." This was a proper use of
Article V as it obtained a consensus from the people before granting more powers to
the government or changing the balance of power among the branches. Once
Roosevelt took office, however, the structural changes affecting the allocation of
powers occurred outside of the Article V process."'
Roosevelt considered implementing his desired structural changes through the
Article V amendment process.11 2 However, Roosevelt decided against utilizing
Article V for four reasons: the lack of agreement in the executive branch on the
language of the amendments, the risk of unfavorable judicial interpretations of any
new amendments, the cumbersome nature of the Article V process, and the fear that
the American people would not elect him again in 1936 if he was proposing new
amendments.11 3 Instead, Roosevelt appointed Justices that would issue favorable
interpretations aligned with Roosevelt's goals for the role of the federal
government." 4
Prior to the New Deal era, the Court had interpreted the Commerce Clause
narrowly to limit congressional power, but the new interpretations during the New
Deal era expanded congressional powers under the Commerce Clause and gave
complete deference to Congress.11 5 While the commerce power previously was
limited by whether the regulated object was part of the stream of commerce and

107. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 126-29, 137-40 and accompanying text.
109. Griffin, supra note 42, at 50.
110. Id. at 50-51.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 51.
113. Id. at 51-52.
114. ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 26-27. Roosevelt initially proposed courtpacking to
change the composition of the Supreme Court, but a favorable judicial opinion, referred to as
the "switch in time that saved the nine," led Roosevelt to take a more gradual approach through
individual appointments. Id. at 26.
115. Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New Deal
Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 23 (2012).
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whether it had a direct impact on interstate commerce, by the end of the New Deal
era these limitations were eradicated.116 The expansion of the commerce power
culminated in 1942 in Wickard v. Filburn."7 In Wickard, a farmer growing wheat for
his own personal use was subjected to federal regulations because the fact that the
farmer was growing wheat for himself meant that he was not buying wheat on the
market. 1" If everyone grew wheat for personal use, then the wheat price would
decrease, and therefore, a farmer growing crops for his own use was engaged in
interstate commerce. 119 An astounding number of logical hoops were used to reach
this conclusion based on the language of the Commerce Clause. This new
interpretation defied Justice Benjamin Cardozo's concerns that "absent a limiting
principle . . . the commerce power would undermine all limitations on federal
regulatory power." 120 Furthermore, the interpretation as a reaction to the crisis of the
Great Depression countered Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes's belief that the
"Constitution could and should not be interpreted for specific outcomes no matter
what the emergency."121
The impact of the expanded interpretation of the commerce clause during the New
Deal was far-reaching. In general, courts thereafter interpreted the Commerce
Clause's grant of power to Congress as having little to no limitation. 122 Instead, how
the Commerce Clause was defined and limited under the Constitution became a
political process of interactions between the executive and legislative branches of
government, "usually without recourse to judicial review." 123 The new interpretation
"represented a foundational change in constitutional theory and the relationship
between the Court and political branches of government." 124 Stephen M. Griffin
stated that "[o]ne need not believe in rule-of-law constitutionalism to think that the
changes in the role of the national government in the regulation of the economy

116. Id. at 15 ("The new-New Deal Commerce Clause interpretation essentially expanded
the close and substantial relation test used in some of the earlier cases by broadly allowing
regulation of all activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce."); see also
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
117. 317 U.S. at 111.

118. Id. at 127-28.
119. Id. ("The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be
produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by
producing to meet his own needs. That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where,
as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.").

120. Jackson, supra note 115, at 33. Justice Cardozo warned against an unlimited
Commerce Clause power in his concurrence in Schechter Poultry in 1935.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).

121. Jackson, supra note 115, at 33. In his majority opinion in Schechter Poultry, Chief
Justice Hughes wrote that "[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional
power." 295 U.S. at 528.
122.

Griffin, supra note 42, at 54.

123. Id. at 55.
124. Jackson, supra note 115, at 15.
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proposed by President Roosevelt were so fundamental that they should have been
authorized through appropriate amendments. "125
"Judicial deference to rational regulation by Congress" established in this era
lasted well into the 1990s.126 While the changes to the Commerce Clause occurred
during a time of crisis, the lasting effect of the changes during "calmer times" has
been the creation of "a regulatory state and congressional power affecting everything
from pensions to civil rights." 12 7 The Court did not attempt to reign in the powers of
Congress until the 1990s, and by then the damage was already done. 128 Because of
the longstanding precedents, the 1990s Court could not simply revert back to the
limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause based on the text; instead, the Court
had to create artificial limitations based on theories not supported by the
constitutional text. 129 Considering interpretation should have at least some basis in
text, this is not an ideal situation.
When analyzing constitutional change outside of the Article V process, Bruce
Ackerman points to the New Deal Commerce Clause changes as a legitimate form
of change based on a model used by the Founders in ratifying the Constitution and
by Congress in ratifying the Reconstruction Amendments. 130 This model consists of
a constitutional impasse, electoral mandate, challenge to the dissenting institutions,
switch in time, and consolidating election. 131 Under this model, Presidents use Court
appointments based on their "mandate from the people" to attempt a legitimate
constitutional transformation. 132 In the New Deal context, President Roosevelt
appointed Justices with views favorable to his vision of the federal government's
powers under the Constitution. 133 Then the Court issued "transformative judicial
opinions," changing the interpretation of the Commerce Clause from a limited grant
of power to a broad, plenary grant of power. 134 Ackerman characterizes these New
135
Deal opinions as the "functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments."
The lasting effect of this new interpretation was "providing a solid foundation for
activist intervention in national social and economic life for the past sixty years." 136
Ackerman's model indicates that the New Deal was a legitimate change to the
Constitution because the President and Congress won a landslide victory, indicating

125.
126.

Griffin, supra note 42, at 51.
Jackson, supra note 115, at 15, 23.

127. Id. at 18.
128. Id. at 23. The Court began placing limitations on the Commerce Clause in United
States v. Lopez in 1995. 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). InLopez, the Court held that the Commerce
Clause only applied to economic activity, and therefore, Congress could not regulate gun-free
zones for schools as this was not an economic activity. Id. at 551; Jackson, supra note 115,
at 45.
129. Jackson, supra note 115, at 23, 25 (arguing that the post-1990 decisions limiting the
Commerce Clause did not have a basis in the language "among the states" in the Constitution).
130. ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 3-31.
131. Id. at 20.
132. Id. at 26-27.
133. Id. at 26.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.

PROTE.CTIONSA GA INST TYRANNY

2020]

353

a popular mandate for the President's commercial policies. 137 However, a popular
vote for Congress or the President is not also a vote for changing the Constitution.
Indeed, Roosevelt specifically avoided discussing change to the Constitution when
campaigning for the presidency in 1936.138 It is unlikely that when voting for
Roosevelt and a Democratic-majority Congress the people were deliberating on
changes to the proper powers of the federal government and whether those changes
would be appropriate during both the crisis of the Great Depression and long after
the crisis was over. Even with a "degree of consensus behind him as a national
leader," Roosevelt understood that he "could not be certain that the consensus would
persist on any particular reform issue, especially when it involved an important
change to the Constitution." 139 But for an extraconstitutional change to be legitimate,
the people must express a consensus to the change to the Constitution, not simply to
the President as a leader. The greatest problem with granting more powers to the
government under the Constitution without a consensus by the people is that it is
nearly impossible for the people to take those powers back.14
The Court should not have extended powers to Congress in the years between
1935 and 1990 in derogation of the text of the Constitution. Emergency is not a valid
reason for permanently granting additional powers to the federal government. This
allows the government to continuously expand its powers during every emergency
without any checks to limit the power once the emergency is over.
II. BROAD INTERPRETATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The analysis I have used to argue that courts should interpret grants of power
narrowly in the Constitution does not apply to individual rights. Courts should
interpret individual rights broadly and prevent the government from infringing on
those rights. The Founders were interested in protecting inalienable rights,14 1 not in
limiting those rights, and therefore, Article V does not preclude courts from
protecting rights implicitin the Constitution. When protecting individual rights based
on overly broad interpretations, the Court is not taking power from the people and
giving it to the government, but instead is taking power back from the government
by preserving rights already retained by the people. Because the Court has no
incentive to derogate the power of the federal government, 142 the Court is less likely
to abuse its discretion in interpreting protected rights.
In support of this contention, this Section will first establish that the Founders had
no intent for the Article V process to be exclusive in expanding protectable
constitutional rights, and that the structure of the Constitution necessitates an
expansive interpretations of rights. Finally, this Section will explore the differences

137. Id. at 3-31.
138.
139.
140.

Griffin, supra note 42, at 52; see also Griffin, supra note 109 and accompanying text.
Griffin, supra note 42, at 52.
See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.

141. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
142. While a government body may have an incentive to take more power for itself, it does
not have that same incentive to limit its own power or the power of its coordinate branches.
See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text; see supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
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between powers and rights that each require the different approaches to constitutional
interpretation.
A. The Founders'Intent (or Lack Thereof) for Article V and Individual Rights
Although there is significant support that the Founders' intent in writing Article
V was to limit the ability of the federal government to easily take power from the
people, 14 3 there is not similar support that Article V was supposed to limit the
recognition of individual rights. First, Article V was added prior to the Constitution
affording any protections for individual rights. Second, broad language of the
individual rights in the Bill of Rights and the recognition of unenumerated rights in
the Ninth Amendment require an expansive interpretation of rights.
When Article V was drafted, there was little debate or deliberation.14 4 The
discussions on Article V did not even begin until the last week of the Convention. 14 5
Because the Framers assumed the structure of the government under the Constitution
would protect the individual rights already held by the people, 14 6 the small amount
of deliberation likely did not concern whether Article V would be used to expand
individual rights. Furthermore, at the time Article V was drafted up until the time the
Constitution was ratified, there was not a single provision providing for individual
rights. 147 Therefore, any consideration that Article V would be the sole process for
expanding rights was unlikely.
Although the Framers likely did not foresee the Court being the entity to protect
and expand individual rights through constitutional interpretation, the Constitution
they wrote necessitated the Court play this role.148 Once individual rights were
written in the text of the Constitution, it was the role of the courts to interpret these
rights and determine when the government had infringed upon these rights. As Chief
Justice Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison, the Court has the power to interpret
the Constitution by the very existence of a written constitution.14 9
Given that the Court holds the responsibility to interpret the rights implicit in the
Constitution, the broad language in the Bill of Rights requires the Court to implement
broad interpretations when effectuating the text. The rights written into the Bill of
Rights express general principles rather than specific ones.150 For example, the
Fourth Amendment protects the right against "unreasonable searches and

143. See supra Part I.
144. Denning, supra note 39, at 164.
145. ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 73.
146. Leslie Kennedy, Before Drafting the Bill of Rights, James Madison Argued the
ConstitutionWas Fine Without It, HISTORY (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/bill

-of-rights-constitution-first-10-amendments-james-madison [https://perma.cc/59KZ-SLDV].
147. U.S. CONST. art. I-VII. The Bill of Rights was not added until the first session of
Congress after ratification. George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred:
Explorations,22 TEx. TECH L. REv. 967, 974 (1991).

148. See infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
149. 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803); BICKEL, supranote 1, at 4.
150. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293
(2007) (proposing interpretative method of finding principles in original meaning and then
applying those principles to modern situations).
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seizures."151 There is no explanation on what is meant by "unreasonable," and so it
is left to the courts in every generation to define "unreasonable" and transform the
vague term into a workable doctrine.15 2 Nothing is more ephemeral in the Bill of
Rights than the right to not "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 5 3 This clause presents the challenge of defining terms like "liberty"
and "due process," which have no concrete meaning."4 The broad language in many
of these amendments require an expansive interpretation of rights.
The interpretation of rights must also expand beyond the broad language of the
enumerated rights because the Ninth Amendment explicitly provides protection for
rights not enumerated in the Constitution."5 The Ninth Amendment states: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." 156 Randy Barnett argues that the Ninth
Amendment indicates that other rights not enumerated in the Constitution are
nevertheless protected under the Constitution on equalfooting with the enumerated
rights.157 According to Barnett, finding an interpretive method that allows the Court
to protect the unenumerated rights is preferable to stripping the Ninth Amendment
with all meaning by declining to protect any unenumerated rights. 158 While Barnett
offers an originalist method for finding the natural rights according to the
Founders, 159 limiting the protected unenumerated rights to those protected in the
founding generation ignores the evolution of rights recognized by the people. 160
Determining evolving rights is a greater challenge than relying on original intent, but
models such as the dialogic model provide an answer for how the Court can
determine evolving rights by listening to the voice of the people. 161

151. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
152.

Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term - Foreword: The Document and

the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 79-80 (2000).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154. See Balkin, supra note 150, at 304 ("The term 'due process of law' in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments is a term of art; it has a specialized legal meaning over and above the
concatenation of the words in the phrase. In cases like these we must try to figure out what
principles underlie the term of art or the use of figurative or non-literal language.").
155. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
156. Id.
157. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 254 (2004) ("The Ninth Amendment mandates that unenumerated natural rights be
treated the same as those that were enumerated.").
158. Id. at 255.
159. Id. at 256.
160. For example, the definition of discrimination on the basis of sex continues to evolve
in both law and in society. Reva B. Seigel, ConstitutionalCulture, Social Movement Conflict

and ConstitutionalChange: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1323, 1413-14
(2006) ("Does government prohibition of same-sex marriage reflect sex-stereotyping or
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons? Does a refusal to promote a young mother with
childcare responsibilities reflect sex-stereotyping or legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons?
Do laws criminalizing abortion reflect sex-stereotyping or legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons?").
161. Although the dialogic model overstepped as it applied to changing enumerations of
power, see supra pp. 40-41, extending rights does not have the same implications or risks
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The lack of intent to limit protected rights and an affirmative intent to further
expand rights continued in the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, with the
expansion of rights applying to the states instead of the federal government. When
looking at the debates for ratification in the southern states, the states understood the
Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee equal rights to citizens and free persons, and to
allow the federal government to intervene when the states failed to protect these
rights.1 62 While the ratifiers had intended to protect the individual rights of citizens
from state infringement, they likely did not intend or foresee that the Due Process
Clause would apply the Bill of Rights to the states through the incorporation
doctrine. 163 However, the ratifiers did intend for a generally expansive interpretation
of rights by phrasing the additional rights in broad principles, namely equal
treatment, due process, and privileges or immunities. 164 Implicit in this broad
language, similar to the broad language of the Bill of Rights, is the requirement for
courts to pursue expansive interpretations of protected rights, enumerated and
unenumerated, as applied to the states. 165 Although this application of the Fourteenth
Amendment results in a different balance of power than the Founders envisioned by
giving the federal government more power to restrict the states, 166 the shift in power
was legitimate because the people deliberated and achieved a measured consensus in
an appropriate implementation of the Article V process.
B. Difference Between Rights and Powers: Incentives and Inalienability
Another basis for encouraging the Supreme Court to interpret individual rights
broadly is that the incentives for establishing and protecting rights are different from
the incentives for the federal government to increase its own power. 167
As previously discussed, the Founders were concerned with the tendency of the
federal government to always take on more power for itself.168 On the other hand,
the Founders were concerned that the federal government would lack the incentive
to protect natural rights. 169 When drafting Article V, the Framers rejected placing the

inherent in extending powers, see infra Section IIB. Furthermore, while the Ninth
Amendment recognizes unenumerated rights, no such parallel language exists for the
recognition of unenumerated powers.
162. JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9-10 (1997).

163. Id. at 252.

164. Although James E. Bond argues that the Due Process Clause was intended to protect
procedural and not substantive rights, he admits that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
substantive and that the equal treatment principal was broad. Id. at 253. He also agrees that
"Section 1 was understood to protect natural rights." Id. at 256.
165. BARNETT, supra note 157, at 254 (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
intended indicated that the states could not infringe upon the unenumerated individual rights
of citizens).
166. BOND, supra note 162, at 252.
167.

See supra notes 42-52

and accompanying text; see infra notes 169-72 and

accompanying text.
168.

See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.

169. See ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 74 (describing delegates at the Constitution
Convention being concerned that without an option for state conventions, Congress would
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sole power to amend the Constitution in the hands of Congress and instead opted for
a process that would include the states and allow for state conventions to propose
amendments.170 George Mason specifically considered that by only allowing
Congress to propose amendments, "no amendments of the proper kind would ever
be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive." 171 The
concern of the Framers was to ensure the people could amend the Constitution if the
structure of government began infringing upon fundamental liberties. 172 This same
concern did not apply in the reverse-that the people would demand too many rights,
infringing upon the government's powers.
In addition to differing incentives, broad interpretations make more sense for
rights than for government powers because while government powers are given by
the people, individual rights are inalienable and held by the people. In other words,
the government must obtain assent from the people before taking on more power, but
the people do not have to gain the approval of the government before asserting
protected individual rights.
When describing state constitutions during the Founding era, Akhil Reed Amar
stated that "[t]hey did not claim to create new rights but to declare ones the people
already had, in reason or custom or both." 173 Because the people retain rights
established in "reason or custom or both," "[b]y their very nature, not all the rights
of the people could be specified." 174 Given that the people already hold the rights,
individual rights written or implicit in the Constitution merely remind the
government that any enumerated powers should not be interpreted to disparage the
rights already retained by the people. It also places the power to protect those rights
in the hands of the Court through the nature of a written constitution rather than
leaving the protection of rights to the general structure of checks and balances and
federalism. 175
Furthermore, the government has an obligation to protect the inalienable rights of
the people. The Declaration of Independence states that the purpose of government
generally is to protect the rights of individuals: "That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed." 1 7 6 Once a right is written into the Constitution's text, it is the
Court's role to interpret that right. Because the Ninth Amendment specifically allows
for the protection of unenumerated rights,177 the Court has license to utilize broad

never make amendments if the federal government became oppressive).
170. Id.
171. Levinson, supra note 70, at 113.
172. See id. ("That is, to limit constitutional amendment only to what gains the assent of
those already ensconced within governmental institutions is, almost by definition, to lessen
the possibility that the occupants of political office will be amenable to proposals that would
significantly affect their interests or, in the language of public choice, diminish the possibility
of engaging in successful rent-seeking for themselves and their supporters.").

173. Amar,
174. Id.

supra note 18, at 480.

175. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
176.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

177. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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interpretations that are more likely to ensure the protection of all individual rights
already held by the people and obligated for protection by the government.
There is some benefit in allowing the Court to experiment with the expansion of
rights through broad interpretations. While an amendment declaring a fundamental
right shall not be infringed is etched into the Constitution forever because it is written
into the document, 178 a right established through interpretation of the Constitution by
the Court can later be adjusted or removed entirely by the Court if it is not a judicially
workable right or not a right that the people consider themselves to hold. 179 Extending
rights through constitutional interpretation allows rights held by the people to
experience "moral evolution over time," transforming with how the people interpret
their own rights. 180
For example, the right to abortion was established in Roe v. Wade based on
substantive due process in the Fourteenth Amendment. 181 The Court was able to
protect the right to abortion implicit in the Constitution without requiring the people
to use the cumbersome Article V amendment process that certainly would not have
succeeded.182 This was followed by massive protests from Americans who did not
view abortion as a right of the people.18 3 Because the right to abortion was in a Court
decision rather than an amendment, the Court was able to refine the right in Planned
Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey to more adequately account for
what the people viewed as a legitimate government interest in the potential life of an
unborn fetus. 184 This ability to take a more limited approach to a right after that right

178. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; id. at XIII-XV; id. at XIX; id. at XXIV; id. at XXVI.
179.

See Denning, supra note 39, at 233 ("A particular advantage for courts (or other

branches of government) is that incomplete theorization allows decisions to be rendered in
spite of 'social dissensus on large-scale issues."').
180. Id. at 234.
181. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
182. Activists attempted to pass the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) that would have
provided for equal protection based on sex, but this attempt failed due to counter-protests
arising when the ERA was sent to the states for ratification after it had already passed through
Congress. Seigel, supra note 160, at 1388-90. If the ERA could not be ratified despite
overwhelming support in Congress, surely the more controversial issue of abortion could not
have been ratified into an amendment in the 1970s. In fact, the accusation that the ERA was
pro-abortion was one factor behind the failure of the ERA's ratification. Id. at 1391.
183. Id. at 1356, n.85 ("The 'pro-life' movement, protesting the Supreme Court's decision
to protect the abortion right has employed violence to deter or punish women visiting abortion
clinics, and to intimidate doctors engaged in the practice. Most notoriously, a 'pro-life'
organization established a website in 1997 known as 'The Nuremberg Files,' which published
the names, photographs, home addresses, and telephone and license plate numbers of dozens
of abortion providers; lines were drawn through the names of doctors killed by 'pro-life'
activists."). Reva B. Seigel argues that countermobilization against constitutional change is a
part of our "constitutional culture," specifically pointing to the ERA and case law on equal
treatment on the basis of sex as an example of when countermobilization appropriately limited
the meaning of equal treatment as proposed by the ERA. Id. at 1324, 1362.
184. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) ("First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose
to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.
..
And third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a
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was recognized is in stark contrast to the inability of the Court to take back the
expansive powers given to Congress under the Commerce Clause during the New
Deal era. 185
CONCLUSION

When considering the original purpose of Article V, constitutional interpretation
must be narrow when interpreting enumerated powers to the federal government and
broad when interpreting rights implicit in the Constitution. The cumbersome
amendment process in Article V places a limit on the federal government's ability to
take on more power for itself or change the balance of power in the Constitution
without a consensus from the people. While Article V limits change to powers in the
Constitution, it does not limit the grant of rights protected under the Constitution.
For one, when Article V was written, there were no rights explicitly protected under
the Constitution, thereby precluding any Founder intent regarding limiting the
expansion of rights to the Article V process; and second, the enumerated rights in the
Bill of Rights were written in broad language and the Ninth Amendment protected
rights not enumerated but still retained by the people.
The dangers and incentives for the federal government to take power require the
Court to issue limited interpretations on the grant of power in the Constitution and to
force the state and federal governments to utilize the Article V process to expand the
enumerated powers. On the other hand, no such dangers or incentives exist regarding
individual rights. The Court should interpret the rights protected by the Constitution
broadly to protect the rights retained by the people and not require the people to use
the Article V amendment process every time they want their government to recognize
rights they already have. The Court cannot create powers not given by the people,
but it canfind rights already belonging to the people.

child. These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each."). Before Casey,
the government had no legitimate interest in the health of the mother or the potential life of a
fetus prior to the second trimester. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164.
185. See supra notes 126-29, 137-40, and accompanying text.
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